# Cosmic-Time Generative Presentism (CTGP) — Explained

Part 02 of 26 (1,667 words)

1.1 Empirical Posture

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CTGP is a thesis about what exists: the present, not the past or the future. Two readings of the

same physics that differ only in this respect make identical predictions for every measurement

(§12.1), so the framework does not claim that any instrument can detect the nonexistence of the

past. Its empirical exposure lies elsewhere: in the requirement that physical law be generable from

the present, which can be refuted (§12.2), and in the consistency of its continuum realization,

which the paper tests (§11).



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2. Philosophical Background: Locating CTGP Among Presentism, Eternalism, and the Growing Block

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2.1 The Standard Taxonomy

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Three major ontological positions on time are standardly distinguished in the philosophy of physics

literature. Eternalism (or the 'block universe' view) holds that past, present, and future are all

equally real; the universe is a completed four-dimensional manifold, and 'now' is merely an

indexical — like 'here' — with no special ontological status. Presentism holds that only the present

exists; past and future are not real. The growing block view, associated with C. D. Broad (Broad

1923) and developed in a relativistic setting by Ellis and Rothman (Ellis & Rothman 2010), holds

that past and present are real but the future is not: reality grows as new events are generated. A

fourth option, the moving spotlight view, keeps the whole block but lets presentness move through

it; Skow (Skow 2015) argues that it is the block universe’s strongest rival, although he ultimately

defends the block.



CTGP occupies a distinctive form of cosmologically grounded presentism, referred to throughout as

generative presentism. Unlike eternalism, CTGP denies the co-existence of past, present, and future.

Unlike growing-block theories, CTGP does not hold that past stages continue to exist; M(σ) is a

formal history, not an accumulating region of spacetime. Earlier states existed when present but no

longer exist. The present alone possesses ontological existence, while causal consequences of prior

states persist through records, memories, radiation fields, material structures, and other inherited

physical encodings. This is the framework's full position on the taxonomy, and it is not re-argued

below: §4.3 and §15.1 address only what CTGP inherits from prior growing-block models, not whether

it is one.



2.2 The Explanatory Challenge for the Block Universe

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The block universe faces a philosophical challenge that is not merely intuitive but structural. In a

truly static four-dimensional block, every event — including every purported moment of 'experiencing

the present' — is simply a fixed point in the manifold. The block does not evolve or generate; it

simply is. The verbs standardly used to describe temporal experience — 'moving through,' 'arriving

at,' 'leaving behind,' 'anticipating' — all presuppose change occurring over time. But change

occurring over time is precisely what the block universe denies at the ontological level.



One standard response is the worldline perspective: from any point along a worldline, past events

are causally connected and future events are not yet accessible. This gives a local asymmetry, but

it is a descriptive asymmetry, not an ontological one. The worldline runs through a pre-existing

structure; nothing is generated. The worldline perspective provides an account of why an observer

would represent things as temporally ordered, but it does not explain why there is any experience at

all — why the mathematical structure would be accompanied by, or would constitute, the felt

succession of 'nows.' Structure alone does not equal experience.



The point can be stated without assuming its conclusion. A complete description of a succession is

not necessarily a succession that is actually occurring. A four-dimensional block can contain every

state of a process and every relation among those states — that B follows A, that the organism at B

remembers A — and the eternalist rightly holds that this is what a temporally extended process is,

with no moving spotlight required. CTGP concedes all of that. What it disputes is that temporal

relations, however complete, amount to temporal becoming: a score is not a performance, and a

trajectory drawn on a spacetime diagram does not move through the diagram. CTGP therefore treats

succession as a primitive feature of reality rather than as a relation within a completed structure.

The present state is generated from its causal predecessor; the predecessor ceases to be the present

state; the successor does not yet exist. The disagreement is thus precise: whether a complete

temporal structure suffices for becoming, or whether becoming is an additional ontological feature

that the ontology must itself contain.



CTGP takes this challenge as a positive constraint on ontology: an adequate ontology of time must

not merely describe the temporal ordering of events but must sustain the conditions under which

genuine temporal becoming — and the experience grounded in it — is possible. The generative

presentist structure of CTGP is its response.



2.3 What CTGP Adds to Prior Becoming-Theories

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Existing theories of becoming in the literature — notably Ellis and Rothman's 'crystallizing block

universe' (Ellis & Rothman 2010), together with the presentist appeals to cosmic time defended by

Craig (Craig 2001) and Zimmerman (Zimmerman 2011) — establish the basic architecture but leave open

several questions that CTGP addresses explicitly. First, they do not provide a physically grounded

growth parameter defined without coordinates for realistic, inhomogeneous spacetimes: cosmic-time

presentists usually take the present from the homogeneous slices of idealized Friedmann models or

from the rest frame of the cosmic background radiation. CTGP identifies the growth parameter with

cosmological time, a geometric invariant fixed by the causal and metric structure of the spacetime

(§6.1). Second, they do not engage the phenomenology of conscious experience as a constraint on the

ontology; CTGP treats the present edge Σ_σ as a natural locus for the ongoing physical processes

associated with experience and develops the implications for philosophy of mind. Third, they do not

articulate the physically instantiated criterion that distinguishes ontological generation from

computational simulation. CTGP fills all three gaps. In the emergent regime, σ is fixed by the

causal and metric structure already present in general relativity and introduces no new propagating

degrees of freedom in the configuration λ = 0 adopted in §6.9.



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3. Phenomenology of Temporal Experience

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3.1 The Phenomenological Constraint

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Any adequate theory of time must satisfy what we call the phenomenological constraint: it must

explain, rather than explain away, the felt asymmetry between past and future — the sense that one

is moving through time from a fixed past into an open future, that the present is where things are

'happening,' and that the past is closed while the future is not. This is not merely an intuitive or

folk-psychological datum; it is a structural feature of experience that any reductive or eliminative

account must engage.



CTGP argues that the block universe does not meet this constraint in the sense sought here — not

because it gives the wrong answer, but because its ontology supplies no becoming for the

phenomenology to track. On the block view, all events are equally real and equally fixed. The

subjective sense of temporal flow becomes at best an illusion — a feature of how observers represent

their situation from inside the block — and at worst an inexplicable brute fact about certain

classes of mathematical structures. The eternalist can reply that thermodynamics, memory formation,

and the architecture of cognition explain why observers have this phenomenology; CTGP’s counter is

that such mechanisms explain why an observer has the experience of passage, not whether passage is

ontologically real. That is the philosophical disagreement at issue.



3.2 Flow, Asymmetry, and the Generated Present

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CTGP's generative ontology provides the required apparatus. Reality advances as a continuously

flowing generative process: the generation flow vector n^μ propagates the present boundary Σ_σ

forward along a smooth, timelike field rather than advancing it frame-by-frame. The differential

notation Σ_σ → Σ_{σ+dσ} represents an infinitesimal increment of this continuous flow, not a

discrete jump between fixed stages. This flow is asymmetric by design: M(σ) formally represents the

generated history of the universe up to the present flow parameter σ, while only the present state

possesses ontological existence, and Σ_σ is the advancing edge at which new structure continuously

emerges. M(σ) should accordingly be read as a formal representation of causal ancestry and

generative ordering, not as a collection of simultaneously existing historical states; the symbol

organizes the lawful sequence of generation, it does not store the generated stages as co-present

entities. The experienced sense of temporal flow corresponds to this actual, continuously unfolding

generative process — not a sequence of discrete snapshots, but a river whose front perpetually

advances.



Crucially, this is not a mere relabeling of the block universe in generative vocabulary. The formal

structure of M(σ) differs from the block in that future hypersurfaces are not part of the domain at

any stage σ — they do not exist to be described, even in principle. The open future is not a gap in

our knowledge of a pre-existing structure; it is an ontological absence. This is the precise sense

in which CTGP sustains an 'open future': the future is genuinely ungenerated, not merely unknown.



3.3 Multiple Registers of the Argument

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The phenomenological case for CTGP can be made in at least three registers. At the intuitive level,

temporal experience has a directionality — a before-and-after — that is not symmetrically available

in both directions. The past is experienced as fixed and determinate; the future is experienced as

open and indeterminate. This asymmetry is not accounted for by the block universe, where all

directions in the manifold are equally determinate. At the analogical level, the distinction between

a finished DVD (block universe) and a live production (CTGP) captures the ontological point: the DVD

encodes a complete structure that is merely revealed as playback proceeds, while a live performance

is actually created as it unfolds. At the formal level, CTGP’s M(σ) structure makes the asymmetry

mathematically precise: the present is ontologically real, the past is historically real but no

longer existent, and the future is excluded from realization.


