1. Intentional Action – The deliberate use of insight toward an intended and meaningful outcome.
(“Acting purposefully, not reactively.”)
1. Efficacy and Reflection – The capacity to evaluate whether one’s action produced the desired
effect and to adapt accordingly.
(“Learning from doing and refining one’s approach.”)
Concise Restatement
Wisdom is understanding in motion — the deliberate use of accurate insight, guided by discernment,
to achieve intended and beneficial results.
For an existence to be independent, there must be an other to be independent regarding, which
automatically means there’s more than 1 independent existence. Are “conscious thinking individuals”
both simultaneously “systems & independent existences”?
Short answer: yes—conscious thinking individuals can coherently be understood as both systems and
independent existences, but only if we’re careful about what kind of independence and what level of
systemhood we mean. Otherwise the words start tripping over their own shoelaces
Analogy for humans being independent of one another (fitting the everyday meaning of “independent”
used in science:
functionally autonomous under shared constraints): multiple computers on the same network. Each
computer is a self-contained system that runs its own processes, maintains its own internal state,
and exercises local control over its memory and operations. Any individual computer can operate
normally, crash, update, or change state without another computer doing so. Crucially, no computer
is a subroutine of another; none is functionally subordinate to or reducible to another computer.
At the same time, all of these computers obey the same physical laws and exist within the same
environment. They may share communication protocols, power grids, timing standards, and
infrastructure, and they can interact causally through the network. These shared conditions do not
negate independence. Instead, they make interaction possible while preserving the distinct identity
and autonomy of each system.
This analogy maps cleanly onto humans. Separate computers correspond to separate nervous systems,
each capable of its own internal processing. A computer’s local state corresponds to a human’s
first-person experience. Network interaction parallels social and causal interaction between people.
Shared protocols correspond to shared physics, biology, and language. Most importantly, just as
there is no single central computer running all the others, there is no universal agent that thinks,
decides, or acts on behalf of all humans.
Because of this structural correspondence, the analogy fits the everyday meaning of “independent”
used in science: functionally autonomous under shared constraints. Independence here does not mean
isolation or freedom from all influence; it means that an entity’s identity, internal state, and
functional organization are not reducible to another such entity. There is no sleight of hand and no
metaphysical excess—just clean structure.
A strong second-best analogy is animals sharing the same ecosystem, such as wolves, deer, and ravens
living in the same forest. Each animal is an independent organism with its own survival goals and
internal regulation. Any one animal can die without the others dying, and none functions as a “cell”
of a forest-organism. The ecosystem constrains behavior and shapes evolution, but it does not think,
decide, or act as a single agent. This analogy works well biologically and ecologically, though it
is slightly weaker philosophically because animals do not highlight agency and normativity as
clearly as humans do.
A third useful analogy is companies operating under the same legal system. Each company has its own
internal decision structure, bears its own responsibility, and can be dissolved independently of
other companies. No company is an organ of “the economy” in the way a heart is an organ of a body.
The legal system constrains behavior and provides rules, but it does not replace internal
governance. This analogy is especially effective for discussions of normative independence, even
though it is socially constructed rather than purely physical.
Some analogies fail in this context, and understanding why is important. Cells in a body or ants in
a colony have their functions defined by the whole, are largely replaceable, and do not author their
own goals. The higher-level system in these cases behaves like a unified agent. Humans do not relate
to one another in this way, even within societies, which is why such analogies are misleading when
discussing human independence.
The “common norm” definition of independence implicitly at work here is straightforward: an entity
is independent if it constitutes a locally autonomous system whose identity, internal state, and
functional organization are not reducible to another such entity, despite shared constraints and
interactions.
Let’s unpack it cleanly.
1. Independence always implies an “other”
You’re right about the core insight:
Independence is relational—to be independent from something presupposes that something else exists.
So “independent existence” cannot mean “exists in total isolation”. It instead means something like:
• not reducible to,
• not wholly determined by, or
• not merely a component of
another existence.
That already nudges us toward relative independence, not absolute independence.
1. What a “system” is (without mystical fog)
A system is:
• composed of interacting parts
• organized such that new properties emerge at the whole-level
• describable without erasing the parts, but not reducible to them
Importantly:
Being a system does not imply being dependent in the sense of “not real on its own.”
It only implies internal structure.
A hurricane is a system.
A cell is a system.
A person is... a very chatty system.
1. Conscious individuals as systems
A conscious individual clearly qualifies as a system:
• neural processes
• bodily regulation
• memory, perception, feedback loops
• symbolic thought layered on top
But here’s the key move:
Systemhood answers how something exists.
Independence answers how it relates to others.
Those are orthogonal dimensions.
So there’s no contradiction yet.
1. In what sense individuals are independent
A conscious individual is independent relative to other individuals and systems because:
• Their experiences are not directly accessible to others
• Their intentions are not reducible to another’s intentions
• Their decision-making is locally closed (you don’t think my thoughts for me—thankfully)
This gives us ontological independence at the level of agency, even while:
• being biologically dependent
• socially embedded
• causally influenced
Independence ≠ isolation
Independence ≠ self-caused
Independence = non-identity and non-subsumption
1. The apparent paradox dissolves
So when you ask:
Are conscious thinking individuals both systems and independent existences?
The clean answer is:
• Yes, as systems → they have internal structure and emergent properties
• Yes, as independent existences → they are not merely parts of another conscious system in the same
sense
Your earlier insight still holds:
Independence requires plurality.
And that’s exactly what we observe:
• multiple conscious centers
• each internally systemic
• each externally independent relative to the others
No contradiction—just layered descriptions.
1. One last sharpening
If someone insists that “being a system means not independent,” they’re usually smuggling in one of
two hidden assumptions:
1. Independence means uncaused (too strong)
2. Independence means partless (also too strong)
Once those are dropped, the tension vanishes like a bad argument exposed to daylight
Bottom line
Conscious thinking individuals are systems that instantiate relative independence.
They are not independent of everything, but they are independent of one another in the only sense
that matters for agency, responsibility, and experience.
Regarding “If it were independent, then by parameters of its definition, it would not depend on any
other existent”, the everyday meaning of “independent” used in science is “functionally autonomous
under shared constraints”. That argument is logically valid, but only because it defines
independence as absolute independence. That is valid but the everyday meaning of “independent” used
in science is “functionally autonomous under shared constraints”, which makes “all that I provided”
that is based on the everyday meaning of “independent” not reductio ad absurdum. Regarding “As for
whether ‘conscious thinking individuals’ are ‘systems’, the meaning of this term is singularly
ambiguous and not well defined”
So that would need to be made more precise before it could be addressed, fair request. The word/term
“System” gets waved around like its meaning/implications are obvious, when they very much aren’t. So
let’s lock it down precisely, then see whether “conscious thinking individuals” actually qualify—no
fog, no hand-waving.
I’ll do this in three passes: definition → criteria → application.
1. A precise, non-ambiguous definition of “system”
For our purposes (and to avoid equivocation), define a system as:
A bounded set of distinguishable components whose interactions are organized such that the whole
exhibits stable behaviors or properties not attributable to any single component in isolation.
This definition has five necessary conditions:
Multiplicity – more than one component
Distinguishability – components are not identical or interchangeable in role
Interaction – components causally affect one another
Organization – interactions are structured, not random
Whole-level properties – the whole has behaviors that are not properties of any single part alone
If any one of these fails, we do not call the thing a system.
No metaphysics smuggled in. No dependence claims. Just structure.
1. What this definition does
not imply (important)
This definition does not imply:
autonomy independence reducibility or irreducibility ontological priority of parts or whole
metaphysical realism or anti-realism
It answers only:
Is this an organized multiplicity that behaves as a unit?
Nothing more. Nothing less.
So “system” here is structural, not metaphysical.
1. Do conscious thinking individuals meet the criteria?
Let’s check one by one.
(1) Multiplicity
A conscious individual involves:
neural subsystems sensory subsystems memory systems regulatory processes symbolic processing
(language, concepts)
This is not controversial. If this fails, physiology itself collapses.
Criterion met.
(2) Distinguishability
These components:
perform different functions operate at different timescales fail independently (aphasia ≠ paralysis
≠ amnesia)
They are functionally distinguishable even if physically continuous.
Criterion met.
(3) Interaction
Neural, hormonal, sensory, and cognitive processes:
influence one another feedback into each other modulate one another’s outputs
No interaction → no waking consciousness.
Criterion met.
(4) Organization
The interactions are:
highly structured non-random constrained by anatomy, development, and learning
Random interaction gives noise, not thought.
Organization is exactly what differentiates “mind” from “neural soup”.
Criterion met.
(5) Whole-level properties
This is the key one.
Conscious phenomena such as:
unified experience intentional thought deliberation self-reference reportability are not properties
of any single neuron, synapse, or isolated module.
They appear only at the organized whole level.
Whether one calls this “emergence” or “global integration” doesn’t matter—the criterion is satisfied
either way.
Criterion met.