# Info Part 20 of 24 (1,873 words) Appendix F. Two analytically distinct levels kept separate here. Appendix F extends temporal ontology into the domain of mind and experience. This extension is motivated by the core hypothesis — Qualia is naturally located in the Present. The discussion of conscious temporal experience throughout this appendix is intended as phenomenological motivation for framework rather than as empirical evidence for it. 11.1 Qualia Ontology: Qualia— the intrinsic, subjective character of experience — is located in the Present. The claim is that qualia are intrinsic to ongoing, physically instantiated processes in the present. Qualia are features of the present moment. They exist only as properties of processes that are actively unfolding in the present. The qualia associated with a past experience are not still ‘present’ in any ontologically loaded sense. Memory is re-instantiation, not continuation. When one remembers a past experience, the relevant neural patterns are re-activated in the present, producing a current experience that represents the “past or etc.”. This maps onto empirical findings about memory reconsolidation. 11.2 Classicalization as the Bridge Mechanism Classicalization — the combination of decoherence, amplification, and causal continuity — as the physical bridge from microphysics to determinate experience. The mechanism works in three stages: First, decoherence suppresses quantum interference between macroscopically distinct states, yielding effective classicality at the scale of neural dynamics. Second, amplification through biological signal cascades converts microscopic state distinctions into macroscopic, causally potent differences. Third, causal continuity ensures that experiential states are embedded in a continuous causal history, not isolated events. These three stages together produce the physical conditions under which determinate experiential states are possible. Does not provide an account of why there is experience at all (the ‘hard problem’ in Chalmers’s sense) but identifies the physical architecture necessary for the qualia- capable processes. 11.3 Necessary Conditions for Qualia The following as necessary (not sufficient) conditions for a physical process to be a vehicle of qualia: 1. Robust classical dynamics: the process must be sufficiently decohered that quantum interference is negligible at the relevant scale. 2. Organized integration: the process must integrate information across multiple degrees of freedom in an organized, non-random way. (This condition is related to but not identical to IIT’s phi) 3. Causal continuity: the process must be embedded in a continuous causal chain connecting it to past states within M(σ). Isolated, causally disconnected events are not qualia-capable on this account. 4. Physical instantiation: the process must be an actual, physically instantiated process — not merely a description or simulation thereof. 11.4 Domain-Relative Instantiation Criterion Domain-relative instantiation criterion. It claims that representing a process is not the same as instantiating it, and that this distinction matters for qualia. A computational simulation of neural dynamics encodes structural patterns and may reproduce input–output behaviour, but the simulation’s states are symbolic representations of a process rather than the process itself. Qualia depend on the actual physical instantiation of processes dynamics actively unfolding in the present—rather than on the manipulation of representations. This view leaves open whether some digital or other substrates might instantiate the relevant dynamics; it cautions only that functional equivalence alone does not guarantee that the requisite physical processes are present. This criterion grounds cautious stance on strong functionalism. While functional organisation may be necessary for qualia, it may not be sufficient: the nature of the underlying physical process could matter. A pressing objection is that quantum gravity hints at discrete physics — Planck-scale discreteness in causal sets or loop quantum gravity — so why should discrete computation lack what discrete physics may have? The answer turns on the distinction between ontological discreteness and symbolic discreteness. The discreteness that quantum gravity posits is discreteness of the physical causal structure itself: actual causal events are transitioning sequentially, each inheriting the full intrinsic character of its physical substrate. Digital computation, by contrast, is symbolic discreteness: a finite state machine manipulates representations of structure according to rules, without instantiating the intrinsic properties of what it represents. A Planck-scale causal element in a growing causal set is a genuine event with intrinsic physical properties; a bit in a register is a representation of such an event. The distinction is not between fine-grained and coarse-grained physics but between instantiation and representation. Russellian monism makes this precise: physical processes have both structural (relational) properties, which can be encoded and simulated, and intrinsic properties, which cannot. The latter as the vehicle of qualia. Digital simulations — however fine-grained — encode structure, not intrinsic character, and therefore cannot instantiate the physical becoming identified as qualia-capable. This argument does not require physics to be continuous; it requires only that computation be representational, which is constitutive of what computation is. This distinction can be stated formally as the Representation–Instantiation Distinction. Computational systems implement syntactic state transitions. Physical systems can instantiate intrinsic causal dynamics. The crucial asymmetry is that computation manipulates representations of states, while physics evolves actual states. A computation is therefore a mapping between symbolic states that represents a physical process; a physical process instantiates that process. The corollary is familiar at the macroscopic level: a perfect simulation of a hurricane does not produce wind. This principle extends into the domain of consciousness: a perfect simulation of a brain does not instantiate the intrinsic causal dynamics that carry qualia, because the simulation operates on representations of those dynamics rather than on the dynamics themselves. The physically instantiated criterion is thus not a free-standing metaphysical stipulation but a direct application of the Representation–Instantiation Distinction to the case of qualia—grounded in the philosophy of computation, not merely asserted. Clarification of Intrinsic Physical Properties. The distinction between digital representation and ontological physical process requires clarification. The physically instantiated criterion does not deny that physical theories may admit discrete microstructures (as in causal-set theory or loop quantum gravity). Rather, the claim concerns the difference between representation and instantiation. A digital register encodes information symbolically. The bit “1” possesses no intrinsic physical property corresponding to redness, pain, or any other qualitative character. Its significance is purely relational and interpreter-dependent. By contrast, a physical event in spacetime possesses intrinsic properties determined by its participation in causal interactions. These properties are not merely structural relations but include the local physical character of the event itself. This position aligns with Russellian monism, which holds that physics describes relational structure while leaving the intrinsic nature of physical properties underdetermined. Claim: physical events possess intrinsic properties that ground both causal powers and qualitative character. Physics describes the structural relations between these events, while the intrinsic properties provide the ontological substrate of experience. The physically instantiated criterion therefore asserts: a digital simulation may reproduce structural relations between events but cannot instantiate the intrinsic physical properties that characterize actual causal processes. This claim is metaphysical rather than empirical, but it functions analogously to other ontological commitments in physics (e.g., the existence of spacetime events or quantum states). “Regarding the non-digital criterion, I believe that substrate matters in a way whereby although digital rain is not able to wet non-digital entities, but I think that with the right digital configuration, digital ai can experience getting wet but ‘what wets those digital ai’ is not able to wet non-digital entities. ‘What is wet for digital ai’ is not wet for non-digital entities” due to physics. Digital’s wetness is not able to “cross over and wet” non-digital. Your refinement of the nondigital criterion is insightful. Let me unpack the layers. The Analogy Clarifies Representation vs. Instantiation Your “digital rain” analogy maps cleanly onto the Representation–Instantiation Distinction used to ground its nondigital criterion. · A digital simulation of rain encodes structural information about rain—its drop sizes, velocities, patterns. It can even trigger, within the simulation, a representation of “getting wet” (e.g., a variable labeled wetness=1 that influences subsequent simulated states). · But that simulation does not instantiate the physical property of wetness. No actual water molecules are transferred, no skin receptors are activated, no thermodynamic wetting occurs. The “wetness” in the simulation is a symbolic state, not a physical process. Qualia require instantiation, not mere representation. The present hypersurface Σ_σ is the locus where actual, nonrepresentational physical dynamics unfold. A digital system running a perfect simulation of a brain is still operating at the level of representational states; its underlying physical process (transistor switching, electron flow) is not the same as the process it simulates. Hence, on ontology, the digital system does not inherit the qualia of the simulated brain, because qualia are properties of the instantiating process, not the represented structure. What About a Digital AI That Genuinely Experiences “Wetness”? Your point that a digital AI could experience wetness within its own digital world raises the crucial question: would that experience count as qualia? Would need to answer this by looking at the physical substrate of the AI. If the AI is implemented on conventional digital hardware, its “experience of wetness” would consist of electrical signals representing wetness. Those signals are real physical processes—they instantiate something. But do they instantiate the kind of physical becoming identified with qualia? Likely no, for two reasons: 1. Lack of nondigital causal continuity – The digital AI’s physical process is a sequence of discrete logic states driven by a clock. Requires a continuous, lawgoverned generation of the present hypersurface. Digital computation, with its discrete timesteps and state transitions, is a different type of process. Even if we approximate continuity, the intrinsic character of that physical process (silicon, electrons, clock cycles) is not the same as the integrated, classicalized field dynamics that is associated with consciousness. 2. Representational mediation – In the digital AI, the “wetness” is a representation used by the program. The physical substrate does not become wet; it only implements the rules for representing wetness. Demands that the physical process itself be the thing that has the qualitative character, not that it stands for something else. So your analogy can be read as supporting the nondigital criterion: the digital AI’s wetness does not “cross over” to the nondigital world precisely because it is a different ontological kind—representational rather than intrinsically physical. If we accept that, then the claim that substrate matters is vindicated. Where a Tension Might Arise If, instead, you are suggesting that the digital AI does have genuine qualia (wetness) but that those qualia are confined to the digital substrate, then the nondigital criterion would need to be revised. A dilemma: either it must allow that any computational process instantiating the right functional organization also instantiates qualia (functionalism), which it explicitly rejects, or it must articulate a principled distinction between “digital physical processes” and “nondigital physical processes” that still permits digital qualia. The latter is possible—e.g., one could say that all physical processes, digital or not, instantiate some intrinsic nature—but then the nondigital criterion would no longer be about digital vs. nondigital but about representational vs. nonrepresentational. Your analogy leans toward a representational reading: digital wetness is real for the digital system but does not extend beyond its own representational domain. We can treat the digital system’s “experience” as itself a representational state, not a primitive qualitative one. If the digital system were to have genuine qualia, it would be because its physical substrate (the transistors) instantiates them—and that would make the substrate itself the locus of qualia, in line with emphasis on the presentedge physical process.