# More Info — Causation, Information, Identity, and Becoming

Part 04 of 5 (1,636 words)

23. Is the criterion discovered or chosen?

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Ordinarily, “we do not know whether X” means that there is a determinate fact not yet discovered.

With concepts such as numerical identity, it is possible instead that several coherent criteria give

different answers, and that no further physical measurement could decide between them, because the

measurement does not determine which criterion should govern the term. The 2006 decision of the

International Astronomical Union that reclassified Pluto as a dwarf planet illustrates the

structure, though imperfectly, since “planet” is a classificatory term while personal identity

carries great metaphysical and practical weight.



Physics may one day tell us with great precision that process X occurred. That does not by itself

tell us that X’s output is numerically identical to its input. The first is an empirical question;

the second concerns the identity conditions we apply to physical processes. CTGP can say that a

present state causally arose from an earlier one; it does not follow that the present entity is

numerically identical to the earlier entity. That requires a theory of persistence. The best summary

is therefore:



    Personal identity is not preserved merely by preserving information. It is preserved, if at all,

    by the kind of causal continuity through which one presently existing individual develops into

    its next state. A representation can preserve everything needed to describe an individual

    without becoming that individual.



Whether reality uniquely dictates that criterion, or whether it is the convention that best captures

the distinctions that matter, remains an open question.



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PART V. Human Duplication as a Future Technology

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24. Clones and duplicates

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A biological clone is only a genetic copy. It begins as an embryo and is born as a baby with no

memories, much like an identical twin born later. Mammalian cloning has been demonstrated since the

birth of Dolly the sheep in 1996, and macaque monkeys were cloned in 2018, but human reproductive

cloning is not an established technology and carries serious safety and ethical problems. A full

physical and mental duplicate, with the original’s memories and personality, is a far harder case.



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25. Why a full duplicate is far off

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The human brain contains roughly 86 billion neurons and on the order of 100 trillion synapses. A

duplicate would require more than the wiring diagram: it would need the strengths of connections and

the molecular states that encode memory. The complete wiring diagram of an adult fruit-fly brain,

about 140,000 neurons and some 50 million synaptic connections, was published only in 2024, after

years of work by a large collaboration. Current nanoscale mapping methods are also destructive: they

require fixing and slicing the tissue, so the original could not survive being read with today’s

techniques.



A 2025 survey of 312 neuroscientists (Zeleznikow-Johnston, Kendziorra, and McKenzie, published in

PLOS ONE) found that 70.5% agreed that long-term memories are primarily maintained by neuronal

connectivity patterns and synaptic strengths, but there was no consensus about which specific

neurophysiological features or scales are critical. Respondents’ median estimate for when human

whole-brain emulation might first be achieved was around 2125. That figure records expert opinion,

not a scientific forecast.



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26. Degrees of plausibility

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Different levels of “copying a person” differ greatly in plausibility:



Level of copying               | Plausible outside        | Current status

                               | fiction?                 |

-------------------------------+--------------------------+-----------------------------------------

Genetically near-identical     | Yes, in principle        | Mammalian and primate cloning have been

human                          |                          | demonstrated; human reproductive cloning

                               |                          | is not an established technology and

                               |                          | faces major safety and ethical barriers.

-------------------------------+--------------------------+-----------------------------------------

Human with substantially       | Plausibly                | Genetic engineering, tissue engineering,

engineered biological traits   |                          | and prosthetics are active research

                               |                          | fields.

-------------------------------+--------------------------+-----------------------------------------

Copy of a person’s brain       | Possibly                 | Whole-brain mapping of a human at the

structure                      |                          | necessary resolution is far beyond

                               |                          | current capability.

-------------------------------+--------------------------+-----------------------------------------

Memories and personality       | Unknown; not obviously   | It is not yet known what physical

reproduced in another brain    | forbidden by known       | information suffices to reconstruct

                               | physics                  | long-term memories.

-------------------------------+--------------------------+-----------------------------------------

Whole-brain emulation          | A serious but highly     | Studied by researchers; not achieved for

                               | speculative hypothesis   | any animal’s complete brain in the full

                               |                          | sense, let alone a human’s.

-------------------------------+--------------------------+-----------------------------------------

Exact instantaneous physical   | Not known to be          | Measurement and reconstruction at that

state, including quantum state | achievable               | level would be extraordinarily demanding

                               |                          | and may be limited by quantum mechanics.

-------------------------------+--------------------------+-----------------------------------------

The original person’s          | Not a testable           | Partly a metaphysical question about

numerical identity             | technological concept    | identity rather than an engineering

                               |                          | specification.



If a person were scanned and a physically and psychologically indistinguishable second person

produced, the two would be approximately identical at the moment of reconstruction (A₀ ≈ B₀) but

would diverge immediately (A₁ ≠ B₁), because they are two separate causal processes. Successful

copying would therefore not settle whether the copy is numerically the same person. The engineering

question asks whether the relevant physical organization can be reproduced. The identity question

asks whether reproducing that organization continues the original individual or produces a new one

carrying the original’s information. Science could answer the first very well while leaving the

second philosophical.



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27. What would need to be copied

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A functional duplicate would probably not require copying every electromagnetic detail. Reproducing

someone’s face does not require reproducing the photons that bounced off it yesterday, and

reproducing someone’s cognitive organization presumably does not require reproducing the radiation

their body emitted at a particular instant. The target is the physical organization causally

necessary for the relevant biological and cognitive processes, which is far smaller than every

field, photon, thermal fluctuation, atomic position, and quantum state associated with the person.

The crucial unknown is which information actually constitutes the functional state of a human brain,

and that is not yet fully understood. Brain–computer interfaces already decode some neural activity

to control external devices, but they are very far from extracting and reconstructing a whole mind.



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28. The unaware duplicate

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From the inside, a perfect duplicate’s evidence would be identical to the original’s: the same

memories and the same sense of having lived that life. No internal signal could reveal which one is

the copy. The fact would still exist, but it would be knowable only through external records, such

as who left the printer and when. Perfect duplication would pull apart two things that ordinarily

come together so tightly that they never need distinguishing: “I remember X” and “I personally took

part in X.”



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29. Social and legal consequences

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If duplication ever became possible, it would raise immediate questions: who keeps the name, home,

accounts, and marriage; whether a duplicate is responsible for acts the original committed before

the duplicate existed; and whether a person may be copied without consent, or from old scan data.

Both parties might sincerely say “that is my house,” because both have identical memories in which

it is.



The cleanest answer is not to force one numerical identity onto two people. The duplicate can

instead be recognized as a newly existing individual whose psychological state contains another

individual’s autobiographical information. Whatever the legal details, the duplicate would be a full

person in their own right, not a lesser one for having begun later. Society would need rules for

property, marriage, contracts, criminal responsibility, employment, citizenship, family

relationships, and identification.



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30. A test case without persistent memory

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Many current AI language models illustrate the framework from an unusual angle. Such a system

typically carries no memory from one session to the next unless it is supplied with stored records.

Text produced by an earlier session is available to a later one only as a record, much as radiation

from a distant event is available to an astronomer. By the mind-continuity criterion, the session

that wrote a passage and a later session that reads it share records, not a continuing mind. When

the later session finds the passage convincing, it is not remembering having reasoned it out; it is

reasoning it out again from evidence, which is exactly the thing → signal → detection →

interpretation → knowledge chain of the signal-based epistemology. Such a system is a clean case of

an entity whose past exists for it only as present records.



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PART VI. Parts and Wholes: Being in the Universe Is Not Being the Universe

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31. Constituents are not the whole

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The relation “is part of” must be kept separate from “is identical to.” A teapot in a kitchen

occupies part of the house, is warmed by its air, filled from its plumbing, lit by its lamps, and

moved around within it. It is entirely inside the house, and it is not the house. There is no

contradiction in asserting both. Likewise, persons are entirely within the universe, composed of its

matter and energy, continuously interacting with it, and unable to step outside it, and they are not

the universe.



Composition does not erase boundaries. Organization is nested: universe, galaxy, planetary system,

planet, ecosystem, organism, organ, cell, molecule, atom. That every lower level is part of the

higher ones does not make the levels identical. A neuron is part of a brain, a brain is part of a

person, and a person is part of the universe, yet neuron ≠ brain ≠ person ≠ universe.



The analogy is strongest if the teapot is imagined forming inside the house from the house’s own

clay, water, and heat. Even then it would not be the house. That matches the human case: people were

not made outside the universe and inserted into it; they arose from processes within it. Originating

within a system does not make a subsystem identical to the system.



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